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Abstract
Epidemics of water-borne infections often follow natural disasters and extreme weather events
that disrupt water management processes. The impact of such epidemics may be reduced by
deployment of transmission control facilities such as clinics or decontamination plants. Here we
use a relatively simple mathematical model to examine how demographic and environmental
heterogeneities, population behaviour, and behavioural change in response to the provision of
facilities, combine to determine the optimal conﬁgurations of limited numbers of facilities to
reduce epidemic size, and endemic prevalence. We show that, if the presence of control facilities
does not aﬀect behaviour, a good general rule for responsive deployment to minimise epidemic
size is to place them in exactly the locations where they will directly beneﬁt the most people.
However, if infected people change their behaviour to seek out treatment then the deployment
of facilities oﬀering treatment can lead to complex eﬀects that are diﬃcult to foresee. So careful
mathematical analysis is the only way to get a handle on the optimal deployment. Behavioural
changes in response to control facilities can also lead to critical facility numbers at which there
is a radical change in the optimal conﬁguration. So sequential improvement of a control strategy
by adding facilities to an existing optimal conﬁguration does not always produce another optimal
conﬁguration. We also show that the pre-emptive deployment of control facilities has conﬂicting
eﬀects. The conﬁgurations that minimise endemic prevalence are very diﬀerent to those that
minimise epidemic size. So cost-beneﬁt analysis of strategies to manage endemic prevalence
must factor in the frequency of extreme weather events and natural disasters.
∗K.A.M.Gaythorpe@bath.ac.uk
1 Introduction
Epidemics of water-borne infections, such as cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases, often follow ﬂood-
ing and other natural disasters when drinking water is contaminated and sewerage management is
disrupted. It is mostly developing countries that are aﬀected (Bouzid et al., 2013; Katsumata et al.,
1998; Vollaard et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2007; WHO, 2006; Date et al., 2011; Ahern et al., 2005;
Noji, 2000; WHO, 2006). The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that Vibrio cholerae
alone causes approximately ﬁve million cases each year, leading to 120,000 deaths (WHO, 2014).
Here we use a mathematical model to examine how demographic and environmental heterogeneities
can be exploited to manage such epidemics as eﬀectively as possible given limited resources.
Cholera is an environmentally transmitted infection. Susceptible individuals can be infected
by ingestion of water or food contaminated with V. cholerae. Infected individuals shed bacteria,
further contaminating the environment and perpetuating the transmission cycle. Five main control
measures have been shown to limit or break this cycle: treatment of infected individuals, vaccina-
tion of susceptible individuals, provision of clean water, provision of sanitation, and environmental
decontamination. Treatment of infected individuals with oral rehydration salts or antibiotics re-
duces the duration of infection and intensity of shedding. Vaccination of susceptible individuals
provides broad but waning immunity to infection. Provision of clean water reduces contact between
susceptible individuals and the contaminated environment. Provision of eﬀective sanitation reduces
the proportion of bacteria shed by infectious individuals that enter the environment. Decontami-
nation reduces the lifespan of bacteria in the environment (Andrews and Basu, 2011; Mwasa and
Tchuenche, 2011; Neilan et al., 2010; Eisenberg et al., 2013; Mukandavire et al., 2013; Tuite et al.,
2011; Ochoche, 2013). Several mathematical modelling studies have examined the eﬀects of these
control measures on cholera epidemics. The epidemic risk in disease-free populations has been as-
sessed using variants of the basic reproduction number. It has been shown that the risk is a product
of social and economic factors with critical parameter values and population susceptibility dictating
the possible epidemic behaviour. Sanitation aﬀects the inﬂuence of the environmental reservoir on
the risk (Codeço, 2001). The epidemic risk may be reduced most eﬀectively by applying control
strategies concurrently, rather than individually (Mwasa and Tchuenche, 2011), and targeting par-
ticular groups in heterogeneous populations (Eisenberg et al., 2013). Assessment of the endemic
disease burden has shown that decontamination can be an eﬀective control measure but may be
insuﬃcient to eradicate cholera if shed and contact rates are high (Ochoche, 2013). Assessment of
the disease burden of a single epidemic has aimed to quantify the incidence reduction achievable
through the provision of clean water, vaccination or antibiotics (Andrews and Basu, 2011). It has
been shown that the ideal combination of control strategies depends on characteristics such as the
ratio of asymptomatic to symptomatic cases, the average recovery rate and the duration of immu-
nity (Neilan et al., 2010).
Mathematical modelling studies have also examined how cholera epidemics are aﬀected by spa-
tial structure and other heterogeneities in the population or environment. It has been shown that
heterogeneities in clean water provision and sanitation aﬀect outbreak severity at local and global
scales (Mari et al., 2012; Njagarah and Nyabadza, 2014) and models with spatial heterogeneity
predict the development of cholera epidemics better than homogeneous models (Mari et al., 2015).
Models indicate that the hydrological network topology strongly aﬀects the speed of the epidemic
wave front as the disease propagates Bertuzzo et al. (2007, 2010), and can result in transmission
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bottlenecks (Shuai et al., 2013; Shuai and Driessche, 2014). Human migration has been shown
to be important for inter-catchment bacterial transport (Mari et al., 2012) and determining how
best to allocate health care resources (Rinaldo et al., 2012). Here we contribute to understanding
how human behaviour and population structures combine to inﬂuence the management of cholera
by examining the eﬀects of human movement, city structure and subpopulation heterogeneities on
the optimal deployment of control facilities in endemic and epidemic settings. We model disease
transmission in a large city with a basic spatial structure that accommodates heterogeneities in
population density or clean water provision. We consider an epidemic associated with a natural
disaster such as a ﬂood and examine where, with respect to the heterogeneities, a limited number
of control facilities should be deployed to minimise the number of infections. We show that the
optimal distribution of control facilities depends on whether disease is absent or endemic before
the perturbation, and what facilities are available. We also show that, when disease is endemic,
the optimal pre-emptive deployment of control facilities to reduce the lifetime infection risk under
endemic circulation is diametrically opposed to the optimal deployment for reducing epidemic size
in the event of a perturbation.
1.1 Mathematical model
Our model framework is motivated by the archetypal structure of a developing world city (Potter
and Lloyd-Evans, 1998): a central hub is surrounded by residential and industrial areas with pop-
ulation densities and the provision of services such as sanitation determined by the availability of
transport links into the centre. We model this arrangement as a metapopulation structured into
ﬁve patches in a star formation; a central patch connected to four peripheral patches (Figure 1).
Individuals reside in a given patch but also interact with the environment of some other patches
as a result of habitual travel. Residents of peripheral patches also interact with the environment
of the central patch. Residents of the central patch also interact with the environment of all the
peripheral patches. There is no direct bacterial transport as we consider human movement to be
more important at the city scale and wish to focus on its impact. All patches are assumed to be of
equal area. However, patches may be heterogeneous with respect to either the size of the resident
population (eﬀectively population density since area is constant), or the rate at which people in the
patch come into contact with the environment (a measure of sanitation provision). When popula-
tion density is heterogeneous the total population is divided between the ﬁve patches such that 15
resides in the centre and 45 reside in the peripheral patches, distributed non-uniformly as detailed in
Table 1. When environmental contact rates are heterogeneous, the rates in the peripheral patches
are distributed as detailed in Table 1, and the rate in the centre is the average of the peripheral
rates. When densities or contact rates are homogeneous, each patch is assigned the average value
of the heterogeneous distribution. A control facility provides either treatment or decontamination.
Facilities may be assigned to some patches. Individuals are grouped according to the patch in which
they are resident and their infection status. State variables Sj , Ij , Tj , Rj describe the total num-
ber of susceptible, infected, treated and recovered individuals that are residents of patch j where
j ∈ {c, 1, 2, 3, 4} indexes the central hub and each of the four peripheral patches. Additional state
variables Bj describe the concentration of bacteria in the environment in patch j.
The population is assumed to be at demographic equilibrium. The per capita birth and death
rates are both µ, and the size of the population resident in patch j is Nj . The movement of people
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couples patches. The nature of the coupling between patches i and j is modelled with a single
parameter σij which weights the interaction a resident of patch i has with patch j. This parameter
reﬂects the tendency of people to be in each patch, summarising the fraction of people that travel
together with the frequency and duration of their visits. The parametrisation of coupling terms
such as these can be achieved by a decomposition using a gravity model (Chao et al., 2011; Gatto
et al., 2012; Mari et al., 2015, 2012; Rinaldo et al., 2012; Tuite et al., 2011). Here, however, we
wish to maintain a simpler model structure in order to focus on speciﬁc eﬀects. Therefore, for
individuals resident in patch j ∈ {c, 1, 2, 3, 4} that are uninfected, or infected but treated, i.e. in
states Sj , Tj or Rj , interaction with their residential patch is weighted σjj = σ and interaction with
all other patches combined is weighted 1 − σ. For residents of peripheral patches j = 1, .., 4 all of
this interaction occurs in the centre patch. So σjc = 1− σ. For residents of the centre patch c the
interaction is divided equally between the peripheral patches. So σcj =
1
4(1− σ).
The interaction weights for individuals resident in patch j ∈ {c, 1, 2, 3, 4} that are infected but
not treated, i.e. in state Ij , are modiﬁed to reﬂect the inclination of such individuals to seek
treatment. Let χ1 < 1 be an inertia weight reﬂecting the disinclination of an infected individual
to move away from a location where treatment is available. Let χ2 > 1 be an animation weight
reﬂecting the inclination to move toward a location, within an individual's habitual travel area,
where treatment is available. Then, for individuals resident in a peripheral patch j that are in state
Ij , interaction with their residential patch is weighted σ
I
jj where
σIjj =

σχ2
σχ2+(1−σ)χ1 if j has a treatment facility and c does not
σχ1
σχ1+(1−σ)χ2 if j does not have a treatment facility and c does
σ if both j and c have treatment facilities, or neither do.
(1)
In the same way as before σIjc = 1 − σIjj . Equation (1) adjusts the basic interaction weight of
uninfected individuals σ according to the infection related inertia and animation weights χ1 and χ2.
It has the desirable characteristics σjj → 1 as χ2 → ∞ if there is a treatment facility in j but not
c, σjj → 0 as χ2 →∞ if there is a treatment facility in c but not j, σjj = 0 if χ2 = 0 and σjj = σ
if χ1 = χ2 = 1 and treatment facilities do not motivate any inertia or animation.
For infected residents of the central patch the weighting is complicated by the fact that treatment
may only be available in some of the peripheral patches. Let the proportion of peripheral patches
with treatment facilities be ρ. Then, for individuals resident in the centre patch c that are in state
Ic, interaction with their residential patch is weighted σ
I
cc where
σIcc =

σχ2
σχ2 + (1− σ)(ρχ2 + (1− ρ)χ1) if c and a proportion ρ of peripheral patcheshave treatment facilities
σχ1
σχ1 + (1− σ)(ρχ2 + (1− ρ)χ1) if a proportion ρ of peripheral patches havetreatment facilities but c does not
σ else.
(2)
Equation (2) adjusts the basic interaction weight of uninfected individuals σ according to the
infection related inertia and animation weights χ1 and χ2, scaled by the proportion of peripheral
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patches with treatment facilities. These scaled weights also give interaction weights outside of the
residential patch σIcj where
σIcj =

(1− σ)ρχ2
σχ2 + (1− σ)(ρχ2 + (1− ρ)χ1) if c and j have treatment facilities
(1− σ)(1− ρ)χ1
σχ2 + (1− σ)(ρχ2 + (1− ρ)χ1) if c has a treatment facility and j does not
(1− σ)ρχ2
σχ1 + (1− σ)(ρχ2 + (1− ρ)χ1) if c does not have a treatment facility and j does
(1− σ)(1− ρ)χ1
σχ1 + (1− σ)(ρχ2 + (1− ρ)χ1) if neither c nor j have treatment facilities.
(3)
Equations (2) and (3) have the desirable property that, under equivalent conditions, the inter-
action weights of residents of the central patch are the same as those of residents of a peripheral
patch. If all the peripheral patches have treatment facilities, or none of them do, the residential/non-
residential interaction weights for residents of the central patch are equal to the equivalent weights
given by equation (1) for residents of a peripheral patch when there is a treatment facility in the
centre but not in the residential patch, or vice versa.
While interacting with the environment of patch j, susceptible individuals come into contact
with the bacterial reservoir at rate βj and each contact leads to infection with probability
Bj
κ+Bj
where κ is the half-saturation constant. So the force of infection Fc experienced by residents of the
central patch is composed of terms representing exposure in patch c, and exposure in each peripheral
patch i
Fc = βc Bc
κ+Bc
σ +
∑
j
βj
Bj
κ+Bj
(1− σ)
4
. (4)
Similarly, the force of infection experienced by residents of peripheral patch j, Fj is composed of
terms representing exposure in patch c, and exposure in patch j:
Fj = βc Bc
κ+Bc
(1− σ) + βj Bj
κ+Bj
σ. (5)
Infected individuals recover at rate γ or, while they are interacting with a patch with a treatment
facility, receive treatment at rate ξ. So infected residents of the central patch are treated at rate
Hc, and residents of peripheral patch j are treated at rate Hj where
Hc = σIccξc +
∑
j
σIcjξj
Hj = σIjcξc + σIjjξj
(6)
and
ξi =
{
ξ if patch i has a treatment facility
0 if patch i does not have a treatment facility.
(7)
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Treated individuals recover faster than untreated individuals, at rate αγ where α > 1. Infected
individuals, including those that have been treated but have not yet recovered, shed bacteria at
rate η. So the total rates at which bacteria are shed into the central patch, Gc, and into peripheral
patch j, Gj , are composed of terms representing the contributions of residents and non-residents.
Gc =
σIccIc +∑
j
σIjcIj + σTc +
∑
j
(1− σ)Tj
 η
Gj =
(
σIcjIc + σ
I
jjIj +
(1− σ)
4
Tc + σTj
)
η.
(8)
Note that this diﬀers from the model proposed by Mari et al. (2015), where non-residents can
be infected by the bacterial reservoir, but do not contribute to it.
Bacteria in the environment degrade naturally at rate ζ and are removed by decontamination at
rate θi where
θi =
{
θ if patch i has a decontamination facility
0 if patch i does not have a decontamination facility.
(9)
A ﬂow diagram for the system is shown in Figure 1. The epidemiological dynamics for residents of
patch i ∈ {c, 1, 2, 3, 4} are given by
S˙i = µNi −FiSi − µSi
I˙i = FiSi − (γ +Hi + µ)Ii
T˙i = HiIi − (αγ + µ)Ti
R˙i = αγTi + γIi − µRi
B˙i = Gi − (ζ + θi)Bi.
(10)
Parameter values are given in Table 1. The basic reproduction number for the system is straightfor-
ward to calculate using the Next Generation Matrix method (Diekmann et al., 2010; Diekmann and
Heesterbeek, 2000; Heﬀernan et al., 2005; Arino and Van den Driessche, 2003; Arino and van den
Driessche, 2006). With the parameter values given in Table 1, and when no control facilities are
deployed, the `disease-free' parameter sets give R0 around 0.9 before the `ﬂood' perturbation, and
around 1.8 during it. Hence the disease-free equilibrium is stable in the unperturbed system, and
unstable in the perturbed system. The `endemic' parameter sets give R0 around 2.8 in the unper-
turbed system and 5.6 in the perturbed system. So the disease-free equilibrium is unstable in these
cases. We have not made an analytic assessment of the stability of the endemic equilibrium, but
numerical convergence of the ordinary diﬀerential equations to these points suggests they are stable
for all the parameters sets we considered such that R0 > 1. Further details of the R0 calculation
and additional values for the system can be found in the Supplementary Information, Table S1.
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Parameter Meaning Value
N Total population 7× 105
Nj Homogeneous resident population, all patches (*) 1.4× 105
Nj Heterogeneous resident population, patch j =
[c, 1, 2, 3, 4] (*)
[1.4, 0.98, 1.26, 1.54, 1.82]×
105
µ Birth/death rate, average lifespan 70 years 4× 10−5
σ Residential interaction weight, non-infected 0.67
χ1 Inertia due to treatment facility 0.2
χ2 Animation due to treatment facility 2
βj Homogeneous contact rate with environment, all
patches, endemic (*)
1
βj Homogeneous contact rate with environment, all
patches, disease-free (*)
0.1
βj Heterogeneous contact rate with environment, patch
j = [c, 1, 2, 3, 4], endemic (*)
[1, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3]
βj Heterogeneous contact with environment, patch j =
[c, 1, 2, 3, 4], disease-free (*)
[0.1, 0.07, 0.09, 0.11, 0.13]
κ Half-saturation constant for transmission 2.5× 107
ξ Treatment rate 0.5
γ Recovery rate, average infection duration 5 days 0.2
α Recovery rate enhancement due to treatment 3
η Unperturbed bacterial shedding rate, scaled by reser-
voir volume
17.86
ζ Natural bacterial degradation rate 0.25
θ Bacterial decontamination rate 0.5
Table 1: Parameter values used throughout the analysis unless stated otherwise. (*) indicates a
parameter set option. There are homogeneous and heterogeneous population size Nj and contact
rate βj parametrisations. In addition there are contact rate parametrisations such that the disease-
free equilibrium is stable, or the endemic equilibrium is stable. All rates are per day. The values of
η, β, κ, γ, η, θ are based on those used in previous studies (Chao et al., 2011; Codeço, 2001; Gatto
et al., 2012; Mari et al., 2012; Mukandavire et al., 2011; Piarroux et al., 2011).
1.2 Methods
We consider the dilemma faced by healthcare planners and disaster response teams. We wish to
determine where, in a city structured by commuting patterns, population density and clean water
provision, a limited number of control facilities should be deployed to minimise the impact of an
infectious disease epidemic following a perturbation in transmission rates. We consider situations
in which, prior to the perturbation, disease is endemic or the population is disease-free. The control
facilities are deployed reactively, as soon as the ﬂood occurs, with the objective of minimising the
epidemic size. In the case of endemic disease we also consider deployment of control facilities pre-
emptively, in the unperturbed system, with the objective of minimising the lifetime infection risk
and contrast this with the conﬁgurations that minimise epidemic size in the event of a perturbation.
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We use our model to simulate the breakdown in water management following a natural disaster.
We take a system at a stable equilibrium, either disease-free or disease-endemic, as determined by
the environmental contact rate parameter set βj . We then simulate a ﬂood by perturbing these
contact rates, and the rate at which bacteria enter the environment η. These parameters are dou-
bled as shown in Figure 2. For initially disease-free populations, the perturbation is accompanied
by a small number of infections (a total of 7 infected individuals distributed in proportion to the
population sizes of each patch). The perturbation lasts for 50 days, after which βj and η return
to their previous values. The increase in transmission leads to an epidemic that begins to subside
when the perturbation comes to an end or the susceptible population is exhausted.
In terms of epidemic management we deﬁne the optimal conﬁguration of the available control
facilities to be the one that minimises the epidemic size following the perturbation. The epidemic
size is, for the purposes of this analysis, deﬁned as the total number of new infections between the
start and end of the perturbation, a duration of 50 days, in excess of the number that would have
occurred over the same time period in the unperturbed system. We also considered the epidemic
size over a period of 365 days; the optimal conﬁgurations did not change. We ﬁnd the number of
new infections by numerical integration of system (10). For reactive deployment the initial condition
is the equilibrium state (disease-free or endemic) with no control facilities present. For pre-emptive
deployment it is the equilibrium state with the given conﬁguration of facilities present. We consider
conﬁgurations of one to four treatment facilities, of one to four decontamination facilities and of
one to nine facilities composed of any combination of up to ﬁve treatment facilities and up to
ﬁve decontamination facilities. We ﬁnd the optimal conﬁgurations by exhaustive search. We use a
metric δ to locate these optimal conﬁgurations in the `operating space' of all possible conﬁgurations.
The metric is deﬁned as follows. Let ZC be the size of the perturbation-induced epidemic under
any given control facility conﬁguration C. Let Z0 and ZF be the corresponding epidemic sizes
when there are, respectively, no control facilities, and a full complement of control facilities. A full
complement means ﬁve treatment or ﬁve decontamination facilities when only one type is used, or
ﬁve treatment and ﬁve decontamination facilities when both types are used. Then we deﬁne δ to
be the reduction in epidemic size achieved with conﬁguration C relative to the reduction achieved
with a full complement of facilities:
δ =
Z0 − ZC
Z0 − ZF (11)
If δ = 0, conﬁguration C is the same as not making any intervention. If δ = 1, conﬁguration C is
as eﬀective as a full complement of facilities. If δ > 1, conﬁguration C is more eﬀective than a full
complement of facilities.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Reactive deployment
We ﬁrst consider the optimal deployment of decontamination or treatment facilities at the moment
the perturbation begins. The patches in which control facilities are deployed can have a notable
impact on the epidemic size. For example Figure 3 shows infection prevalence over time following
the perturbation when population density is heterogeneous, disease is endemic and a single decon-
tamination facility is reactively deployed to each of the ﬁve possible patches. In this case it is
optimal to locate one decontamination facility in the centre patch. This leads to an epidemic that
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is 9.2 % smaller than the least eﬀective deployment.
Table 2 summarises the reactive conﬁgurations of control facilities that are optimal, or nearly
optimal, in terms of minimising epidemic size. These are the same for heterogeneous densities or
contact rates. The top four rows summarise the general rules for one to four facilities of the same
type. The optimal, or nearly optimal, conﬁguration of decontamination facilities is to place one in
the centre and then prioritise peripheral patches with the highest population densities or environ-
mental contact rates. The situation for treatment facilities is more complicated. If the system is
initially at disease-free equilibrium and one or two facilities are available, the ﬁrst is placed in the
centre patch and a second is placed in the peripheral patch with the highest density or contact rate.
However, if three or four facilities are available the optimal conﬁguration switches such that the
central patch is omitted and facilities are located in the peripheral patches with highest contact rate
or density. This switch results in a markedly lower epidemic size than adding additional facilities
to the optimal conﬁguration of two facilities. If the system is initially at endemic equilibrium the
situation is similar, but the switch to the conﬁguration that omits the centre patch only occurs
when four facilities are available. The bottom row shows the general rule for one to nine facilities
chosen from a pool of ﬁve treatment and ﬁve decontamination facilities. Initially decontamination
and treatment facilities are placed in the central patch. For the disease-free parameter sets, this
deployment is suﬃcient to reduce R0 below 1 even after the perturbation. Hence all conﬁgurations
of two ore more facilities that include this dual deployment to the centre prevent an epidemic and
are eﬀectively indistinguishable using our method of ranking by epidemic size. For the endemic
parameter sets, however, the R0 is greater than 1 after the perturbation for all facility deployments.
In this case, if more than two facilities are available, decontamination facilities are placed in the
peripheral patches, prioritising those with the highest population densities or contact rates. Then
treatment facilities are placed in the peripheral patches, prioritising those with the lowest population
densities or contact rates. However, if nine control facilities are available the optimal conﬁguration
omits the treatment facility from the central patch. In a few cases, as detailed in Table 2, the
conﬁgurations determined from these rules are not quite optimal; an alternative conﬁguration leads
to a marginally smaller epidemic size. However, these deviations are small and sensitive to the
parametrisation details, as detailed in the Supplementary Information Tables S2 and S4). So the
rules we have described are good indicators of conﬁgurations that are optimal, or very nearly optimal.
The numerical values in Table 2 indicate, for single facility types and heterogeneous densities,
the impact on the epidemic size of the optimal conﬁguration relative to a full complement of facilities
according to our metric δ (equation 11). If the system is initially at endemic equilibrium, a single
treatment facility in the central patch is very eﬀective in reducing the epidemic size but reasonable
further reductions can be achieved by adding more facilities to the periphery. Note, however, that
it is more eﬀective to deploy four treatment facilities in the optimal conﬁguration than it is to
deploy ﬁve i.e. a facility in every patch. A single decontamination facility in the central patch
has a modest impact and a steady incremental beneﬁt accrues from each additional facility up
to a total of ﬁve. If the system is initially disease-free, a single treatment facility in the central
patch achieves is almost as eﬀective as deploying facilities to all ﬁve patches. Adding further
facilities to the periphery has a very small impact. A single decontamination facility in the central
patch is very eﬀective, there is a non-negligible return from adding one further facility to the
periphery, but further facilities have little impact. When contact rates are heterogeneous or two
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facility types are deployed, the general patterns of the single facility type analysis carry through
(see the Supplementary Information Table S6). As noted above, if the system is initially disease-free
placing treatment and decontamination facilities in the central patch pushes the basic reproduction
number of the perturbed system below one. So all conﬁgurations that include this deployment
entirely prevent an epidemic and are indistinguishable.
1.3.2 Pre-emptive deployment
We now consider the deployment of treatment and decontamination facilities in advance of any
perturbation. When the system is at disease-free equilibrium before the perturbation it makes
no diﬀerence whether control facilities are deployed reactively or pre-emptively, so the optimal pre-
emptive conﬁgurations are as given in Table 2. However, when the system is at endemic equilibrium,
the control facilities aﬀect the steady-state prevalence before the perturbation as well as the epi-
demic that follows it. In this case a natural objective of a control facility deployment is to minimise
the lifetime infection risk in the absence of a perturbation. But this objective may be in con-
ﬂict with the objective of minimising epidemic size given a perturbation. We examine this tension
by ﬁnding the conﬁgurations that are optimal in each sense. We quantify the endemic risk as the
lifetime probability of infection 1−S∗/N where S∗ is the total susceptible population at equilibrium.
Table 3 shows that the objective of minimising lifetime epidemic risk under endemic circulation
is in direct opposition to the objective of minimising epidemic size in the event of a perturbation.
Any deployment of control facilities reduces the lifetime infection risk, but this increase in the size
of the steady-state susceptible population also increases the epidemic size in the event of a pertur-
bation. So the `optimal' conﬁguration with respect to epidemic size is the one that leads to the
smallest increase in the number of infections, rather than the largest decrease. The top four rows
show the conﬁgurations for one to four facilities of the same type. In order to minimise lifetime
infection risk, the required conﬁgurations are in broad agreement with the rules for reactively placed
facilities: generally prioritise the centre followed by high density peripheral patches. In order to
minimise epidemic size, one to three decontamination or treatment facilities are all are located in
the peripheral patches, prioritising those with the lowest population densities or contact rates. For
four decontamination facilities this rule is extended and no facility is placed in the centre patch. For
four treatment facilities the conﬁguration switches to one in which a facility is placed in the centre
patch, and no facility is placed in the peripheral patch with the lowest density. This conﬁguration is
markedly better than omitting the centre patch. The bottom two rows of Table 3 show the optimal
conﬁgurations of both facility types. Again there is there is a sharp distinction between the rules
for pre-emptively placed conﬁgurations to minimise infection risk, and the rules for minimising epi-
demic size.
The numerical values in Table 3 indicate, for single facility types and heterogeneous population
densities, the impact on the epidemic size, or the lifetime infection risk, of the optimal conﬁguration
relative to a full complement of facilities according to our metric δ. Values for heterogeneous contact
rates and two facility types are given in the Supplementary Information, Table S7. Each additional
decontamination facility returns a fairly steady incremental reduction in the lifetime infection risk.
A single treatment facility reduces the lifetime infection risk substantially, and additional facilities
return small incremental reductions. With regards epidemic size, recall that the largest epidemics
occur under a full complement of control facilities. So δ is a measure of the cost in terms of the
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size of a perturbation-induced epidemic of a particular conﬁguration; lower values are better. Up
to four decontamination facilities can be deployed to the peripheral patches with relatively limited
increases in the epidemic size, but the deployment of a ﬁfth facility to the central patch leads to a
large increase. In contrast, each treatment facility that is deployed results in a steady incremental
increase in the epidemic size. These broad trends remain when both facility types are deployed.
1.4 Discussion
We have examined how structured heterogeneities in population density and the rate of contact with
the contaminated environment combine with a behavioural response to aﬀect the optimal deploy-
ment of treatment and decontamination facilities to limit epidemics of environmentally transmitted
infections such as cholera. Our model was based on a star, or hub-and-spokes, framework motivated
by the archetypal structure of developing world cities. This abstraction omits direct connections
between peripheral patches in the interests of simplicity. Introducing these additional edges requires
a systematic framework to record and determine which peripheral patches are connected, with what
weights and with what dependence on the distribution of treatment facilities. This substantial
increase in model complexity will make it more diﬃcult to extract general rules from the output.
We anticipate, however, that peripheral connectivity would have the eﬀect of increasing mixing in
the population, diluting the impacts of spatial structure and other heterogeneities. The simple hub
and spokes structure of our model, with heterogeneous patches coupled through people's habitual
movement, cannot be expected to produce detailed predictions or speciﬁc control recommendations
for real world systems. The necessity of numerical analysis means that we cannot oﬀer a succinct
formula encapsulating the answer in full generality. Instead this study oﬀers fundamental insights
into the problem of epidemic control in structured systems that provide support for real-world deci-
sion making, informing the construction and analysis of detailed models for speciﬁc circumstances.
Sensitivity analysis, detailed in the Supplementary Information Figures S1 - S10, suggests that our
results are robust to variation in most model parameters. The key parameters that do aﬀect our
results are indicative of the mechanisms behind the dynamics and are discussed in detail below.
We have shown that, even in our relatively simple system, the dynamics and the decision making
can be complex. Four factors stand out. (1) The behavioural response of the population to control
facilities can aﬀect how they should be deployed. Optimal conﬁgurations of decontamination facil-
ities are diﬀerent to those of treatment facilities in a large part because infected individuals were
attracted to locations where treatment is available. (2) Adding to an existing optimal conﬁguration
of control facilities does not necessarily lead to another optimal conﬁguration. There are critical val-
ues of the number of facilities to be deployed at which optimisation requires a switch to a markedly
diﬀerent conﬁguration. (3) In some cases a single optimally placed control facility can be almost as
eﬀective as deploying control facilities in all locations, and four treatment facilities may be better
than ﬁve. (4) Pre-emptive control facility deployments can have conﬂicting consequences. The
conﬁgurations that minimise endemic prevalence are very diﬀerent to those that minimise epidemic
size in the event of a transmission perturbation. We now explore the mechanisms behind some of
these observations.
The basic principle guiding the location of control facilities is that they should be placed where
they will beneﬁt the most people. But this patch is not always straightforward to identify. For reac-
tive deployment we found that, if only decontamination facilities are used, one should be deployed
10
to the centre and then the peripheral patches with the highest density or contact rate should be
prioritised. The centre is important because the star-structured coupling means that a large propor-
tion of the total population has some exposure to the environment of the central patch. However,
if the coupling strength is reduced (i.e. the residential exposure weight σ is increased) the central
patch becomes less important. If the population densities and contact rates are homogeneous a
decontamination facility always beneﬁts the most people if placed in the central patch; the propor-
tion of residents that beneﬁt from a decontamination facility is the same for all patches, but the
proportion of non-residents that beneﬁt is four times greater in the central patch than in any of the
peripheral patches. However, if the population densities or contact rates are heterogeneous and the
residential exposure weight σ is suﬃciently large, placing the decontamination facility in the periph-
eral patch with the highest population density or underlying contact rate may beneﬁt more people
than placing it in the centre. Figure 4 shows this mechanism in action. Epidemic size is plotted as
a function of the residential exposure weight for systems with one decontamination facility. When
the residential exposure weight is small it is clearly best to place the decontamination facility in the
centre. When the residential exposure weight is large preference switches to the peripheral patch
with the highest population density. When the residential exposure weight is close to 1, so there is
almost no non-residential exposure, even the peripheral patch with the second highest population
density is a better location for a decontamination facility than the centre.
We found that, if only treatment facilities are used, one should be deployed to the centre and
then the peripheral patches with the lowest density or contact rate should be prioritised if one, two
or, in some cases, three facilities are available. But if more facilities are available, the deployment
should omit the centre. The dominant factor governing the optimal conﬁgurations of treatment
facilities is the attraction of infected people to these facilities, summarised in the inertia and an-
imation weights χ1, χ2. If there is no attraction (χ1 = χ2 = 1) then the key factor is again the
residential exposure weight σ, and the optimal conﬁgurations of treatment and decontamination
facilities are similar. If infected people are attracted to treatment facilities the net beneﬁt of placing
one in any particular patch is a trade-oﬀ between accessibility and contamination. The centre patch
may be a good place for a treatment facility because people from all the patches in the system can
beneﬁt from it. However, these people also shed bacteria into the environment while waiting for
treatment. The centre patch is a hub for susceptible people, as well as those that are infected. If
infected individuals are strongly attracted to a treatment facility (χ2 large and/or χ1 small) in the
centre, the consequences of contaminating the hub may outweigh the beneﬁts of accessibility. In this
case it is preferable to omit the centre and place treatment facilities in the periphery. The limited
access to peripheral patches means that a smaller proportion of the infected population beneﬁt from
the facility, but overall the susceptible population beneﬁts from an `auto-quarantine' eﬀect whereby
infected individuals are kept away from the hub and other patches with high population densities
or underlying contact rates. It is this auto-quarantine eﬀect that can result in a deployment of four
treatment facilities being more eﬀective than ﬁve at reducing epidemic size. When there are four
facilities infected individuals show a preference for patches where treatment is available, when there
are ﬁve facilities all patches are equally attractive.
Figure 5 shows the auto-quarantine mechanism in action. Epidemic size is plotted as a function
of the inertia and animation rates, χ1 and χ2 (coupled such that χ2 = 1+ 10(1− χ1)), for systems
with two treatment facilities. When the χ1, χ2 are close to 1, so there is very weak attraction
to treatment facilities, it is best to place the facilities in the centre and the peripheral patch with
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highest population density (region A). This conﬁguration provides access to treatment for the largest
number of people, mainly in their residential patches. As χ2 increases and χ1 decreases, so treatment
facilities become more attractive, it is clearly preferable to switch the peripheral facility away
from the high density patch, although it does not make much diﬀerence where it is placed instead
(region B). The attraction of infected people to treatment facilities means that residents of the
high density peripheral patch without a facility access treatment in the centre patch. This is of
direct beneﬁt to those individuals, and also reduces contamination of their residential patch. It
does, however, increase contamination in the centre patch. As χ2 increases and χ1 decreases further
this contamination of the centre patch makes it preferable to omit the facility from the centre and
focus on containing the contamination in the peripheral patches, prioritising those with the highest
population density again in order to reach the largest residential populations (region C).
The trade-oﬀ between providing access to treatment and limiting contamination is also evident if
we consider how the waiting time to treatment (1/ξ) aﬀects the optimal conﬁguration of treatment
facilities. Figure 6 shows how the optimal location of a single treatment facility depends on the
waiting time to treatment. When the waiting time is short it is best to place the facility in the
centre as this provides access for the largest number of people. As the waiting time increases it
becomes preferable to switch the facility ﬁrst to the highest density peripheral patch, and then to
peripheral patches with successively lower population densities. If infected individuals have to wait
longer for treatment they cause more contamination in the patches where the treatment facilities
are located. Moving the facility to locations with lower population density reduces access, but also
reduces the overall transmission to the susceptible population.
Pre-emptive deployment of control facilities aﬀects the lifetime infection risk under endemic
circulation. It also aﬀects the size of a perturbation-induced epidemic directly, by reducing trans-
mission during the epidemic, and indirectly by altering the endemic state of the population prior to
the perturbation. The conﬁgurations that minimise the lifetime infection risk at endemic equilibrium
also minimise epidemic size under reactive deployment. However, under pre-emptive deployment
all control facility conﬁgurations increase epidemic size compared with the uncontrolled system be-
cause they increase the total susceptible population at equilibrium. Consequently, the pre-emptive
conﬁgurations that minimise endemic infection risk are among the least beneﬁcial when it comes
to minimising epidemic size. So, while the guiding principle remains to place the facilities where
they will beneﬁt the most people, the deﬁnition of beneﬁt requires careful thought. In regions
where extreme weather events or natural disasters are not uncommon, the deployment of facilities
to manage endemic infections can be a double edged sword. The gains made in reducing endemic
prevalence may be oﬀset by more severe epidemics during periods of increased transmission.
2 Conclusion
It seems like a simple enough request: deploy these transmission control facilities where they will
beneﬁt the most people. But making the correct deployment requires careful analysis. Control
measures that do not aﬀect peoples' behaviour, such as decontamination in our analysis, should be
deployed to the areas where the most people, be they residents or non-residents, are exposed to
transmission. But control measures that do aﬀect behaviour, such as treatment in our analysis, can
lead to complex eﬀects that are diﬃcult to foresee. In these cases careful mathematical analysis is the
only way to get a handle on the optimal deployment, and the mechanisms that govern it. Assessing
12
pre-emptive deployments in communities with endemic disease is complicated by conﬂicting eﬀects
on diﬀerent time scales. Reducing endemic prevalence makes the population more vulnerable to
larger epidemics in the event of a transmission perturbation. So cost-beneﬁt analysis of strategies
to manage endemic prevalence must factor in the frequency of extreme weather events and natural
disasters. Cholera and other diarrhoeal diseases are the second largest cause of morbidity in children
under the age of ﬁve years (WHO, 2015). The simple insights presented here are a step towards
more eﬀective control strategies in resource-limited situations.
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3 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Model structure and interactions. The city, shown on the left, is composed of patches in a
star formation. Individuals are resident in a given patch. The peripheral patches are coupled to the
central patch by the residents' habitual movement. Peripheral patches are not directly coupled to
one another. Resident population density or contact rate with the environment may vary between
patches, as denoted by the circle size. Peripheral patches are indexed in ascending order of contact
rate or density. In each patch, disease dynamics occur as shown on the right; treatment and
decontamination are shown in the black circles.
Figure 2: Infection prevalence
∑
j Ij/
∑
j Nj over the course of an epidemic associated with a
perturbation to the contact rates βj and shed rate η between t = 10 an t = 60. The system is
initially at endemic equilibrium. Parameters values are as in Table 1, with heterogeneous population
densities.
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Figure 3: Impact of a single reactively placed decontamination facility on infection prevalence∑
j Ij/
∑
j Nj following a transmission perturbation at t = 0. The decontamination facility was
deployed at t = 0 in a patch indicated by line type: dashed - centre, solid - peripheral patch j = 1−4
with shade indicating the density, black is highest (patch 1). For reference the corresponding
epidemic sizes (×104) are 7.91, 8.64, 8.60, 8.57, 8.55 when the decontamination facility is in patch
c, j = 1 − 4 respectively. Parameter values as in Table 1 with population densities heterogeneous,
contact rates homogeneous and disease endemic in the unperturbed system.
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Table 2: Optimal conﬁgurations of reactively deployed control facilities to minimize the size of the
perturbation-induced epidemic. The top four rows show the conﬁgurations of one to four facilities
of the same type, decontamination or treatment, in a system that is initially at endemic equilibrium
or disease-free equilibrium. The bottom row shows the conﬁgurations of one to nine facilities chosen
from a pool of ﬁve decontamination and ﬁve treatment facilities. Conﬁgurations are the same for
heterogeneous population densities (Nj) or environmental contact rates (βj). Larger circles indicate
patches with higher densities or contact rates. Shaded circles indicate control facility locations.
When both types of facility are available, black indicates treatment and grey decontamination. An
asterisk (*) denotes that the conﬁguration shown is nearly optimal, but an alternative conﬁguration
may be marginally better depending on the heterogeneity. For details see the Supplementary Infor-
mation Tables S2 and S4. The numerical values indicate, for heterogeneous densities, the impact
of the optimal control conﬁgurations relative to a full complement of facilities, as quantiﬁed by
the metric δ, equation (11). Additional values of δ can be found in the Supplementary Informa-
tion Table S6. (#) Note that deploying a decontamination and a treatment facility to the central
patch reduces R0 below 1 with the perturbed disease-free parameter set. Hence all conﬁgurations
of two or more facilities that include this dual deployment to the centre prevent an epidemic and
are eﬀectively indistinguishable using our method of ranking by epidemic size.
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Table 3: Optimal conﬁgurations of pre-emptively deployed control facilities to minimize the lifetime
infection risk at endemic equilibrium, or the epidemic size in the event of a perturbation. Conﬁg-
urations are the same for heterogeneous population densities (Nj) or environmental contact rates
(βj). An asterisk (*) denotes that the conﬁguration shown is nearly optimal, but an alternative
conﬁguration may be marginally better depending on the heterogeneity. For details see the Supple-
mentary Information Tables S3 and S5. The numerical values indicate, for heterogeneous densities,
the impact of the optimal control conﬁgurations relative to a full complement of facilities, as quan-
tiﬁed by the metric δ. Note that, with regards the epidemic size, under pre-emptive deployment δ
is the increase relative to the uncontrolled epidemic and so is minimised. Additional values of δ can
be found in the Supplementary Information Table S7.
19
Figure 4: Size of perturbation-induced epidemic depending on the residential exposure weight σ
when population densities are heterogeneous and the system has one reactively placed decontami-
nation facility. Line style denotes the decontamination facility location: centre (dashed); periphery
(solid, darker shades indicate higher densities). The system was initially at disease-free equilibrium.
Parameters were as shown in Table 1.
Figure 5: Size of perturbation-induced epidemic depending on the tendency of infected individuals
to seek treatment facilities when population densities are heterogeneous and the system has two
reactively placed treatment facilities. The tendency to seek treatment is governed by the inertia
and animation weights χ1, χ2 which, here, are coupled such that χ2 = 1 + 10(1 − χ1). Line style
denotes the treatment facility locations: centre and periphery (dashed, darker shades indicate higher
density peripheral patches); periphery only (solid, darker shades indicate higher average densities).
In regions A, B and C the optimal conﬁgurations are as indicated. Parameters were as in Table 1
with the system initially at disease-free equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Size of perturbation-induced epidemic depending on the waiting time to treatment 1/ξ
when population densities are heterogeneous and the system has one reactively placed treatment
facility. Line style denotes the treatment facility location: centre (dashed); periphery (solid, darker
shades indicate higher densities). The system was initially as disease-free equilibrium. Parameters
were as in Table 1.
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